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DEVELOPING STATE TRADING IN A PERIPHERAL ECONOMY:
Reflections on Tanzanian Experience Related to 
Papua-New Guinean Possibilities
By Reginald Herbold Green
The emergence of state trading involves a change 
in industrial organisation, often involving a 
change in the nationality of the firms and, 
a shift from public to private firms. Changes 
in economic results or in political dynamics will 
result from an interplay of these three elements.
... the structure of industry establishes the logic 
of choice and perhaps of action, but not the outcome. 
The exercise of power determines the outcome, and 
sufficient power may alter the structure. ... It 
may be more important to know the nationality of a 
company than whether it is public or private.
- J. Zysman,"The State As
Trader", International Affairs, 
1978.
Ideological differences between countries affect 
the method, not necessarily the fact, of securing 
national control. The real ideological choice is 
between controlling the economy through domestic 
private enterprise, or doing so through some 
state or other collective mechanism. But ... it is 
extremely doubtful whether it is a practical choice 
for an African nationalist. The pragmatist in 
Africa ... will find that the choice is between 
foreign private ownership on the one hand and local 
collective ownership on the other ... A capitalist 
economy means a foreign dominated econom y.. . The 
only way in which national control of the economy 
can be achieved is through the economic institutions 
of socialism.
President Julius K. Nyerere,
"Economic Nationalism", 1968
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I
A. Introduction
This paper seeks to survey the experience of developing 
state trading (state commercial sector) in one peripheral 
economy, the United Republic of Tanzania (or more precisely 
mainland Tanzania), with a view to providing a backdrop and 
isolating issues for consideration by those responsible 
for analyzing and advising on the possible development 
of a state commercial sector in another peripheral economy, 
Papua-New Guinea.
It does not purport to:
a. provide a complete, detailed history of Tanzanian 
state trading, nationalisation or public enterprise 
development;
b. present the general theory of state trading (assuming 
there is an agreed body of theory) especially not
in relation to industrial (capitalist or socialist) 
or medium productive force level economies;
c. outline a detailed course of action for Papua-New 
Guinea as opposed to a series of questions, comments 
and indications of probable choices open and 
constraints present which may help Papua-New Guinean 
decision taking. The author has never been to PNG 
and has no claim to more than a rather cursory
and fragmentary knowledge of its specific political, 
institutional and personnel goals, challenges and 
constraints.
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Tanzanian state trading development over 1961-1978 is 
examined neither to construct a transferrable model nor 
to "prove" what PNG decision takers and managers should do 
or avoid. Reality is more complex than that. The validity 
of Technical Cooperation Among Developing Countries indeed 
rests in part on greater similarity of contexts and objectives, 
but not on any possibility of one to one copying which 
is almost as unsound in TCDC as in standard Technical 
Assistance. Nor is it useful to see Tanzania as "an 
experiment" - no major exercise is an experiment to those 
who participate in it. To view it as such looses much of 
its human reality and therefore much of its usefulness 
to advisers, decision takers and managers seeking to learn 
from it. However, it is examined to raise questions and 
illuminate issues likely to be relevant in the context of 
PNG:
a. the interaction of freedom (what can be accomplished 
or what goals could be chosen) and necessity (goals 
which it was critical to pursue or external realities 
which had to be faced) and their evolution over time 
and as a consequence of previous decisions;
b. the interaction of goals and contexts over time and 
the way in which they changed as a result both of 
Tanzanian action and of events beyond Tanzanian 
control;
c. the interaction of state trading narrowly defined with 
other issues - notably price determination, foreign 
exchange allocation, public enterprise planning and 
control;
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d. the experience over time with state trading in a
political economic context with certain marked and 
additional more general similarities to PNG at 
independence.
An attempt will be made to identify the importance of 
goals for state trading (e.g. national control over the 
economy, public sector surplus, price control, foreign 
exchange saving), of particular contexts (e.g. nature 
of pre-existing private enterprises, characteristics of 
goods and of purchasers, personnel and institutional capacity 
available to the state) and of selections made (e.g. sectoral 
coverage, institutional form, use of external personnel). 
These will then be presented schematically with more 
specific reference to PNG. Finally some tentative 
suggestions as to possible approaches to the development 
of state trading in PNG will be made.
II
B. 1961 - The Starting Point
State trading in Tanzania arose out of the interaction 
of the colonial commercial context and the goals of the 
leaders and Party of the newly independent state.
At independence in December 1961 the commercial sector 
was virtually 100% private. State enterprise - well 
beyond traditional public utilities but collected on a
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rather random basis - was substantial in mining and manufact­
uring but not in commerce. The bulk of consumer goods 
import trade was handled by less than a dozen European 
based firms and the rest by smaller firms owned by non­
citizens or members of economically privileged minority 
communities. Specialist importing was either carried out 
by specialist European firms (e.g. vehicles, machinery) 
or was ancilliary to the operations of European owned 
enterprises (e.g. petroleum). Exports were largely 
handled by European based merchant or brokerage firms 
even when nominally state boards were involved. Diamonds 
were sold by a 50-50 joint venture (Williamsons) to 
the Central Selling Organisation (De Beers) under a 
contract whose later amendment suggests that as of 1961 
it was quite unfavourable to Tanzania. Wholesale trade 
was partly by importers, but the majority of it was carried 
out by perhaps 2,000 local firms - 90% plus owned by 
non-citizens or members of privileged minority communities. 
Specialist retailing (e.g. automobiles, machinery, 
petroleum products) was by importers, the bulk of general 
retailing was handled by perhaps 25,000 small enterprises 
(including the smaller wholesalers) again with at least 
90% owned by non-citizens or privileged minority community 
citizens. Co-operatives,while significant in agricultural 
marketing,were limited in numbers and success in retail 
trade and non-existent at wholesale and import/export 
levels.
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Because the colonial economy in Tanzania dominantly 
produced for sale what it did not consume and consumed 
purchased goods it did not produce, commerce was centered 
on the import/export nexus with retail and wholesale 
funnelling to, or channeling out from,the ports. Under 
a fifth of locally consumed manufactured goods and 
almost no locally used intermediate or capital goods were 
domestically produced. In the cases of three exceptions - 
cigarettes, beer, to a degree cotton cloth - European 
firm owned factories carried out the wholesale function 
delivering direct to subwholesalers/large retailers.
Trade in domestic foodstuffs and a limited range of 
handicrafts were exceptions to the external trade/foreign 
firm character of commerce. Village markets sellers and 
town stallholders and "hawkers" were African. In total 
they did a good deal of business but each seller was 
economically minute and few had succeeded in advancing to 
the small retailer with premises rung of the commercial 
hierarchy. Further, lack of data meant that the size, 
scope and possible potential of this sub-sector was 
consistently overlooked or underrated up to the late 
1960's, while thereafter the commitment to a transition to 
socialism meant that its development into an indigenous 
commercial capitalist class was rejected whether practicable 
or not.
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TANU Goals
The goals of TANU (Tanganyika African National Union - the 
sole party to win any parliamentary seats and subsequently 
the sole mainland party, merged with Zanzibar's Afro-Shirazi 
Party to form the CCM, Chama Cha Mapinduzi or Revolutionary 
Party, in 1977) relevant to commerce were:
a. creation of an egalitarian society with a strong 
state economic role - there was a commitment to 
socialism but a very vague one not closely linked 
to immediate policy;
b. increasing the African role in operation of the 
economy and the government;
c. establishing - through the Party and government - 
effective African control over the economy;
d. increasing the share of income and investible
surplus received by Africans, African owned enter­
prises and the state.
These led to at least five concerns more specifically 
linked to the commercial sector:
1. fairness to African buyers who were (with some
justification) believed to be discriminated against 
in terms of price by smaller enterprises and in terms 
of credit (and charges for it) by larger ones;
-  8 -
2. increasing the African (public or private) share 
of commercial profits (which were, on the whole, 
overestimated) at the expense of the absolute and 
relative share of foreign enterprises and non­
citizens and the relative (not necessarily the
absolute) share of privileged minority community 
citizens;
3. reduction of excess profits - somewhat vaguely 
defined - and profiteering - e.g. raising prices 
during and/or conniving to create brief shortages, 
raising tax paid stock prices after indirect tax 
changes;
4. use of state intervention as the central instrument
for commercial sector change and linking it to a
network of mass worker and peasant based consumer
co-operatives;
5. less consistently encouraging individual African
commercial units. In fact this was not energetically 
pursued even before the clear commitment to socialism 
in the 1967 Arusha Declaration. Compared to other 
African states, Tanzania spent little money on training 
or financing African businessmen/public sector banking 
and investment banking gave them little access to 
credit; licensing laws were never systematically
used to discriminate in their favour.
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C. First Steps - 1961/1966
The Tanzanian government moved rapidly to expand the public 
sector role both in the government subsector - e.g. through 
more comprehensive development planning and industrial 
legislation - and in public enterprise. It faced several 
constraints:
1. pre-independence Tanganyika had rarely balanced its 
recurrent budget, let alone had a surplus for 
investment;
2. the senior civil service were largely expatriate, 
with little public enterprise experience, facing 
major Tanzanianization (and training) as well as 
broadening and changing the scope of services 
provided and functions performed;
3. Tanzanian businessmen with experience even in middle 
sized businesses or middle level positions in large 
enterprises were dominantly from privileged minority 
community members, were in most cases not eager to 
become public sector employees and were in demand by 
European firms seeking to reduce expatriate salary 
bills and build up more respectable looking proportions 
of citizen managers.
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These factors virtually required that state entry into the 
commercial sector be on a relatively modest scale (competing 
with not supplanting the large established firms); 
utilize European managerial skills for initial operations 
and for training citizens; and in some cases be on a 
joint venture basis, Certainly these characteristics of 
1961-65 action could be justified on grounds of gaining 
experience without massive risks, pragmatic gradualism, 
perfecting the market by competition but, in practice/they 
were (as of 1961) virtually necessary choices if anything 
substantial was to be done rapidly with any real 
chance of success.
Intrata: An Initial Breakin
Three main lines were pursued - Intrata in general 
importing, Cosata as a co-operative apex commercial 
unit and strengthening of the Cotton and Coffee Marketing 
Boards.
Intrata was quite overtly launched to win a share of the 
general import business. It was a joint venture with a 
minor existing Netherlands firm whose ambitious manager 
saw a potential for a breakthrough as 40% partner and 
manager in a state trading unit he could never win from 
his existing private sector base. Intrata certainly won
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a niche (perhaps 10%) in the major general importer top 
six but it never showed signs of becoming dominant or 
even challenging the leading firm. It was profitable; 
it did show more initiative in finding low cost sources 
of supply; it did hire - and to a degree train - Africans 
more rapidly than its competitors. Above all it proved 
that a state owned trading company need not be a disaster.
Cosata: A Debacle
That proof was important because Cosata quickly did become 
a disaster. It was intended as the import-export-wholesale 
centre for African retail cooperatives. The overall 
management was Israeli co-operative enterprise based. A 
quick takeoff was followed by a quicker collapse. Most - 
not all - retail cooperatives went bankrupt. Cosata - 
plagued by uncollectable receivables and unsaleable stocks 
nearly followed. Sharp complaints against the management's 
policies - asserted to damage Tanzania and discriminate 
against Africans - were followed by its firing. The 
development of retail co-operative (or indeed public 
sector retail more generally) was so discredited as not to 
become a live issue again until the 1970's and even 
then was pursued with a degree of caution and fearfulness 
clearly owing much to Cosata's debacle.
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What went wrong? The management made two fatal errors.
It assumed that because it knew what was sold by consumer 
co-ops in Israel it knew how to purchase for Tanzanian 
ones. Israeli oranges and wine were symbols of that 
error more than of a malign attempt to dump Israeli 
exports. Further it assumed that because any Israeli 
kibbutz could find a manager, a book-keeper, a committee 
able to run a retail co-op so could any Tanzanian rural 
or urban district; a misconception of truly stunning 
proportions in a country with (then) perhaps 15% adult 
literacy and with most of the (90%) rural population in 
isolated homesteads or hamlets. That private merchants 
sought to break co-ops by underselling selectively is doubt­
less true, given their advantages in stocking and manage­
ment they hardly needed to bother.
The dream of co-operative trading as a quick route to 
African commercial sector participation was probably 
inherently ill founded. The success of crop marketing 
co-ops was misleading - their business management and 
accounting needs were less at primary society level and 
the strongest unions had been built by African "economic 
activists" before independence when their managerial positions 
were among the most attractive open to Africans. However, 
a more gradual approach linked to the stronger unions, 
including major training of society personnel and backed 
by a proper rural and urban shop sales survey might have
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led to a successful, if modest, co-op structure. Certainly 
a limited number of African retail co-ops did remain viable - 
quite noticeably those with educated managers and committees 
including at least some businessmen or financial officials.
Cosata was not allowed to go bankrupt but refloated under 
Intrata management. By 1967 it had cleared its deficit 
and was - on the face of it - a profitable middle sized 
importer and large wholesaler specializing in textiles. 
However, this had been achieved by "confining" all textile 
imports to Cosata. While it did import and wholesale some, 
on the majority it charged a commission of about 2%-in 
theory for advice on what to purchase from whom but in 
practice usually for stamping documents already fully 
agreed by the actual importer and his source of supply.
As a result, if anything, Cosata raised textile prices 
by confinement more than it reduced them by competition. 
Further it set a precedent for confinements as "private 
import taxes" which was to prove hard to control.
The Export Marketing Side
On the agricultural export side the primary society - 
union structures in coffee and cotton were well established 
by independence. These were strengthened and - much less 
uniformly successfully—new co-operatives were promoted
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in other areas and crops. Three problems arose. Many 
primary societies - especially in lower education areas - 
were very badly and/or corruptly run. For low value crops 
and low density of sales areas,co-ops raised marketing 
costs compared to private traders who combined a variety 
of commercial lines while the co-op costs had to be covered 
by marketing alone. The societies - and more especially 
the Unions and the apex Co-operative Union of Tanzania - 
came to be dominated by richer farmers and by salaried 
managers.
Rural credit was placed in the co-op sector via three quasi 
banking institutions. A series of training programmes - 
including a Co-operative College for managers, accountants, 
committee members were created. While doubts arose ,the 
basic criticisms that were to lead to the total disestablish­
ment of traditional co-operatives by 1976 were still in 
the future.
The Cotton and Coffee Marketing Boards - which already 
existed and had some experienced expatriate management and 
selling experience - were strengthened. Here finance was 
not a problem - the Cotton Marketing Board ran large surpluses 
in a majority of years because its price stabilization was 
very cautious and the Coffee Marketing Board's first 
payment was cautious and its second made after proceeds 
and costs were known. The buildup of local auctions and -
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especially in cotton - expert knowledge of world market 
behaviour leading to fairly adroit auction releases and 
minimum prices clearly gained foreign exchange for Tanzania, 
revenue for the Boards and higher prices (and/or more 
services such as cotton roads in the cotton case) for 
producers.
Over the same period considerable attention - involving 
the most able economic and legal personnel available to 
Tanzania (some specially imported for the purpose on a 
part time consultancy basis) was devoted to diamond marketing. 
For technical (number of grades, problems of preparing 
mixed packets), economic (a sellers' cartel is not easily 
surpassed by a minor independent sales organization) and 
mine ownership/management (50% De Beers/100% De Beers) 
reasons it was decided to continue to use the CSO.
However, the CSO's commission was reduced, the royalty 
was raised and - perhaps most critical - an independent 
valuer chosen by Tanzania was interposed between Williamson's 
and the CSO as a check on valuation. By these methods 
Tanzania's revenues were raised absolutely and to 75-80% 
of total potential surplus. In addition rapid training 
was begun and closely supervised by Tanzanian Board members 
and (presently) senior managers with quite dramatic results 
within a decade.
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Contexts and Goals Revisited
By February 1967 (the date of the Arusha Declaration which
brought major changes to the state trading sector) there
had been contextual changes:
1. Perhaps 12^-15% of consumer goods imports were by 
public sector trading companies and perhaps 5-10% 
of intermediate and capital goods imports by other 
public sector enterprises;
2. A limited foothold in wholesaling was held by state 
trading and manufacturing enterprises;
3. African produced crop marketing was increasingly 
co-op and Marketing Board run;
4. Retail co-operatives were perceived as non-viable; 
private African retail business had grown but was 
still a small proportion of total;
5. Public corporation development as publicly owned 
private enterprises with few distinctive characteristics 
other than ownership and moderately more speed in 
citizenization had proved competitive (but unlikely
to become dominant rapidly) and financially viable 
but hardly the highroad to Tanzanian control of the 
economy or egalitarianism).
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The Party's goals had also evolved - largely for reasons 
quite outside the state trading sector's performance as 
such:
1. because a mixed economy led to foreign capitalism 
in Tanzania, a rapid transition to dominantly 
public sector ownership of the major means of 
production and trade was decided upon;
2. because the mixed economy route had proven inegalitarian, 
a much tighter control over wages and salaries was
to be instituted;
3. because the combination of Party or public office
and private business threatened to build a domestically 
dominant capitalist class dependent on foreign enter­
prise, a complete break between Party leadership 
and middle to higher level public sector employment 
and private business activity (including owning 
rental property and shares, serving as a director 
of a private company, having full time year round 
employees other than household staff) was to be 
enforced;
4. socialism, egalitarianism, self reliance and rural 
development were chosen - and both articulated and 
set into implementation as central organizing themes 
for Tanzanian development strategy.
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D. Breakthrough and Crisis: 1967-71
By February 1967 the public sector capacity was greater
than in 19 61:
1. recurrent revenue was substantially above recurrent 
expenditure and local borrowing channels had been 
set up (further their significant enlargement
was a part of the reasoning behind financial sector 
nationalization);
2. government departments and - to a lesser extent - 
public enterprises had substantial numbers of citizen 
staff, specialist expatriates with some analytical 
ability vis a vis public enterprise and the 1961-66 
experience;
3. African managers were still in short supply - the 
manpower allocation system had in fact starved public 
enterprise of intermediate and "0 level" personnel 
until the middle 1960's and only began to allocate 
significant numbers of university graduates in 1967-68 
when Treasury and State House forcefully pointed out 
that, given a dominant state ownership position in 
large scale enterprise, common sense required a flow 
of managerial cadres to realize the potential for 
decision taking opened up by the ownership acquisition 
or creation.
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4. Within existing cadres of citizen public enterprise 
managers (including those de facto hired by national­
izing the firms for which they worked) the problem 
existed that a disproportionate number were of 
privileged minority community ancestry - a situation 
exacerbated because the 1967-71 manpower allocation 
process allocated almost all new graduates from these 
communities to the public enterprise not the civil 
service. The difficulty was not capacity nor - in
any general sense - loyalty, but that to the "man in the 
street" or the "woman in the queue" the makeup of 
citizen managerial cadres quite literally "did not 
look right". The only source of experienced citizen 
managers of African ancestry was the civil service.
5. Because the 1967 nationalizations were broad front 
designed to create a dominant state position in 
manufacturing/ milling and finance as well as external 
trade, the opportunity cost of personnel and time
was high. Realistically only one sector could be 
managed directly - i.e. without a managing agent - 
and for both broad political economic and quite 
specific contextual reasons that sector was finance.
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The Acquisition Exercise
In the case of trade the acquisitions comprised 14 odd 
(some very odd to the point of purely paper existence) 
firms, or their Tanzania assets and liabilities, plus 
the minority private interest in Intrata. Excluding 
Intrata there were four substantial enterprises (or six 
if one treats the three Smith McKenzie group subsidiaries 
as separate companies) whose main operations included:
1. about 20-25% of total imports or over 50% of
final consumer goods and perhaps 10-15% of intermediate 
and capital goods imports;
2. a modest overall export turnover specialized in 
minor products e.g. beeswax, wattle extract;
3. a central position in the initial distribution/ 
wholesaling of imports to main towns;
4. the majority of the shipping agency business.
The initial overall management of the new State Trading 
Corporation (which was a holding and management company 
with the acquired firms, Intrata and Cosata as operating 
subsidiaries) was entrusted on a management contract 
to the ex-minority partner in Intrata. Most of the expatriate 
senior staff of the acquired enterprises were kept on 
secondment (or analogous arrangements) from the parent
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companies terminable at the discretion of either side.
Citizen and permanently resident non-citizen employees 
(the middle management were largely British citizens of 
Asian ancestry b o m  and permanently resident in Tanzania) 
were given employment in the STC group on the same terms 
and conditions they had enjoyed in the acquired companies 
as part of the nationalisation legislation.
The short term restructuring related largely to turning
the subsidiaries into specialized functional units (e.g.
textiles, exports, shipping agencies, food, general
merchandise) with related transfers of personnel and
use of assets. Internal staff training was begun - perhaps
not very systematically - and a significant number of
citizen managerial candidates secured from the civil
service and new graduate allocation. (STC developed tendencies
toward overmanning at managerial levels and did expand,so
over this period no significant reduction in overall expatriate
or resident non-citizen numbers was achieved - indeed,
quite the reverse - though the proportion relative to
citizens fell sharply.)
The initial formation process of STC was constrained on 
the one hand by the goals of securing a dominant position in 
the general import trade and of operating without a transitional 
crises or an enterprise deficit and by the constraints of 
limited public sector personnel for operation or supervision
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and of heavy competing demands for them from other newly 
acquired enterprises. This is the context in which use of 
a known expatriate firm and its known managers as a central 
management contractor and of securing - at least for the 
initial period - the continued services of existing acquired 
enterprise expatriate and non-citizen personnel was seen as 
the only prudent course of action.
The Management Agreement lasted for about three years 
during which STC was consolidated. At that point STC 
was shifted to Tanzanian management but with extensive use 
of McKinsey as consultants on a variety of issues including 
recruitment and operation as well as broader structural 
and strategic reorganization and planning.
Notes on Nationalisation
Three special characteristics of nationalisation require 
mention albeit they cannot be pursued in detail:
1. in these cases the initial handover and phasing out 
of ex-owner staff was smooth and the negotiation of 
compensation,while time and talent intensive,neither 
very embrangled nor resulting in sectoral payments in 
excess of (or even as high as) sectoral public enter­
prise post tax profits;
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2. a remarkable number of discontinuities (such as 
assets having no real relation to trade acquired e.g. 
cement company shares, sisal estate mortgages!);
Tanzania companies owning or investing in other country 
based units of the same group; trading assets not 
owned by the trading company fe.g. the warehouses of 
one group owned by an unacquired building holding unit 
not the acquired trading units) were discovered and 
required tidying up;
3. the impact on private investment in trade was not 
homogenous although until 1971 it was fairly modest. 
General import/export private investment was nil - 
but that was state policy; specialist import firms 
were not, on balance, much deterred from expansion. 
Wholesaling and large retailing if anything grew 
more rapidly over 1967-71 than previously; small 
and medium African private retailing continued its 
limited and uneven growth. A crisis situation in a 
number of wholesale and retail sub sectors (and a milder 
retrenchment in specialist importing) did occur in 1971 
as a result of nationalization of large rental properties 
and was followed over 1971-73 by an attempt to raise 
retail margins drastically to maximize returns before 
further public sector expansion (or to recoup losses
on buildings).
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The first of these elements is moderately typical of 
nationalization (at least when compensation of some variety 
is credibly proposed). While in one sector (not trade) a 
90 day withdrawal of ex-owner senior staff forced earlier 
reorganisation than planned,only one case (again not in 
trade) even approximated the nightmare of taking over a 
closed enterprise with senior staff gone,no coherent handover 
and the firm not in working order. The second element is 
typical of almost any acquisition of existing firms - enter­
prises, like people, acquire rather odd collections of 
things and arrangements over their lifetimes. The third 
is not predictable except in the sense that nationalisation 
or rapid expansion of public enterprise in general is 
unlikely to have positive effects on overall private 
investment. In Tanzania, despite a fairly clear policy 
of transition to socialism, investors were apparantly 
seriously deterred only if their own enterprises or ones 
very similar to them had been directly affected.
During 1967-71 buildup of public sector export marketing was 
consolidated,with co-operative coverage becoming almost 
total for main export crops collection and marketing boards 
performing a similar role for sales to exporters. The 
main hides and skins exporter was acquired as a joint venture - 
a byproduct of the import trade nationalizations. Promotion 
of retail co-operatives as part of the development of 
communal villages was pursued in a low key - and some
success, perhaps up to 10% of rural retail trade - from 
1969 on while occasional higher profile calls for mass 
launching of co-op shops were limited in duration and had 
negligible (positive or negative) impact.
STC under McKinsey advice launched a major centralization 
exercise: merging subsidiaries into the parent company,
seeking to operate ordering and inventory supervision 
totally centrally, proposing a unified computer programmed 
accounts system, etc. In the process it massively expanded 
central office staff acquiring a significant number of new 
expatriates - virtually uniformly more m o d e m  and less 
experienced, more expensive and less interested in Tanzania 
than the (smaller number) "hold over" expatriates they 
replaced. A more unambiguously positive component was a 
citizen training programme at all levels.
Structural Shifts in State Trading
Since 1966 the share - indeed the absolute physical quantity 
of consumer goods imports was reduced both by increased 
domestic production and by tighter import controls. The 
share, physical volume and value of intermediate and capital 
goods imports rose. This had complex results on the role 
of individual public sector firms:
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1. STC was specialized in a relatively declining sector 
of the import business and found that7despite building 
up its share of those goods it did handlefits share
of total imports was stagnant;
2. further it continued to show a bias toward importing 
versus wholesaling local products (largely because 
certainty of delivery and quality, ability to place 
large orders with single firms, availability of 180 
days' credit and use of standard business procedures 
made the import business seem simpler) so that its 
share of wholesaling probably shrank;
3. the manufacturing sector public enterprise imported 
their raw materials and intermediate goods direct 
and handled their own wholesaling. In addition in
a few cases they also handled imports of competitive 
products (e.g. shoe imports were for a time confined 
to the domestic shoe company which, admitedly, had 
been the largest shoe importer before nationalisation, 
but by no means the only one);
4. the gradual acquisition/establishment of more public 
enterprises (including two joint venture cases accounting 
for about 60% of the petroleum importing and distribution) 
meant that overall the public share in import and 
wholesale trade was growing significantly while STC's 
share in state trading was falling and no real coordination 
existed for the balance of the sector.
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STC's response was to seek:
1. to have imports of more goods "confined" to it - 
including specialized parastatal imports on which in 
fact it charged a fee for stamping papers prepared 
by the users;
2. to launch takeover bids for a variety of specialized 
importers.
Although sweeping plans were articulated,the second wing 
of the expansion campaign was only carried out to a small 
extent. The first went further and, unfortunately, raised 
costs to users while muddling some orders and delaying 
others. Asserted gains in finding lower cost sources 
were in part real, but probably at the best offset the fees 
charged on those products.
STC also initiated three further changes:
1. buying for cash on shipment instead of 90 to 180 
days credit (apparantly because the treatment of 
costs was such that this appeared to purchasing 
officials to raise profits because they did not 
offset the interest on domestic overdraft);
2. introducing pan-territorial prices (i.e. 'uniform for 
from 6 to 30 towns instead of based on Dar es Salaam 
plus transport) for a significant number of goods (unfo­
rtunately in most cases by taking the Dar es Salaam 
price as the uniform price not working out "transport 
equilization" fund principles fes had been done in
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sugar and petroleum products when similar pricing had - 
much earlier - been applied to them);
3. rationalizing and restructuring markups - partly to 
make those on luxury goods higher than those on
necessities/but largely to offset the extra costs
from a larger headquarters, the greater interest bill 
and the loss on pan-territorial pricing as it was 
actually handled.
STC in Crisis
Over 1970-71 STC plunged into a complex crisis which ramified
far beyond state trading:
1. the centralized control system failed to function so 
that knowledge on stocks and sales was notable for 
its absence or inaccuracy;
2. as a result inventories by item ranged from 14 years
to minus 3 months (presumptively an accounting 
system error) with a rapid buildup of total stocks to
total turnover paralleling an even more rapid rise
in out of stock items;
3. the endemic shortages were exacerbated up country by
delays in getting data and arranging transport so that
rural areas were starved of basic imported consumer 
goods;
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4. the group slid into the red for fiscal 1969/70
and its 1970/71 recovery (not known at the time given 
the state of accounts) was probably spurious given 
unsaleable stock buildup;
5. the shift to domestic bank (from foreign supplier) 
credit caused a once for all decline in foreign exchange 
reserves in 1970 and 1971 of perhaps $20-25 million
as well as an alarming explosion in domestic credit 
formation - a pair of developments unfortunately 
coinciding with other strains on the foreign position 
to create a reserve crisis in 1971-72.
These developments cheated widespread alarm and massive
reaction;
a. the Bank of Tanzania and the Treasury intervened to 
set interim domestic credit ceilings and import 
licensing controls and took steps to develop comprehensive 
domestic credit and foreign exchange planning;
b. Parliament set up a committee to examine shortages 
and breakdowns of distribution;
c. the Ministry of Commerce and Industry set up an Inter- 
ministerial Working Group (Internal Consultancy Team) 
to analyze what was wrong and to report back.
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The underlying concerns were both political and technocratic. 
First, it was perceived that the speediest way to discredit 
transition to socialism was to allow it to be seen that it - 
literally - could not deliver the goods. Second, starving 
rural areas of basic goods was hardly consistent with a 
rural development national strategic emphasis or with 
encouraging increased marketed output. Third, to allow 
domestic credit and foreign reserves to flow away like 
blood from a cut artery would quickly destroy the capacity 
to meet bills for vital imports and/or deliver Tanzanian 
strategy into the hands of its creditors. Fourth, with the 
bulk of large scale enterprise in the public sector, 
unplanned deficits would destroy both the company tax and 
investible surplus bases for public service and productive 
investment expansion.
Goals and Constraints - End 1971
The state trading constraints of the end of 1971 were 
largely conditioned by the STC crisis:
1. rapid reduction of shortages and building a distribution 
system capable of preventing their recurrence;
2. ending the uncontrolled loss of foreign exchange and 
equally uncontrolled rise of domestic bank credit;
3. reversing the slide into deficit (the 1970/71 appar- 
ant turnaround not being known) and doing so without 
causing additional inflationary pressures.
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These were constraints - not goals - in the sense that they 
were seen as vital to limit the damage to public confidence, 
development momentum and internal/external financial 
stability. Equally they outweighed any general contextual 
factors so far as the state trading sector was concerned.
The goals directly relevant were:
1. to rationalize the overall state trading sector (not 
just STC);
2. to develop a system of price management which would 
protect consumers from margin inflation/inefficiency
nd also protect enterprise surpluses (and company 
tax) so long as they were moderately well run;
3. to build up coherent domestic credit and foreign 
exchange budgeting;
4. to relate the 1971 Party Guidelines emphasis on 
decentralisation and participation to the state trading 
sector.
E. Recovery and Development, 1972-78
January 1972 again showed a significant increase in public 
sector capacity - albeit in relation to state trading this 
was at the time open to serious question:
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1. the domestic recurrent revenue and credit position was 
markedly higher (if under greater strain because of 
even more radically expanded capacity to utilize 
resources) and the technical competence of and Tanzanian 
control over the public financial sector (state and 
financial enterprise) vastly greater than five years 
before;
2. the fact that an Interministerial Working Group which 
was in fact a consultancy team could be created with
a majority of citizen members (and the three expatriates 
Tanzania ministry staff,not outside consultants) 
bears witness to the increase in public sector experience 
and competence vis a vis public enterprises.and the 
fact that this was done in respect of a firm which 
had gone into crisis while receiving detailed consultancy 
from McKinsey and company shows a parallel shift in 
confidence in domestic capacity;
3. the number of African managers had risen sharply.
With the influx of graduates and additional training 
of farmer clerks, foremen and middle managers,so had 
their qualifications while with the passage of time an 
increasing number had substantial experience behind them;
4. because most of the rest of the public enterprise 
sector was operating in the range passably to very 
well and the other problem cases did not have major 
macro spread effects,attention could be concentrated on 
STC in particular and state trading more generally;
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5. similarly the number of successes elsewhere in the 
public enterprise sector led to a belief that STC 
was a problem to be tackled with good chances of success 
not a symptom of any general and inherent pathology 
of public enterprise. This view was especially strongly 
held by the public institutions (e.g. Party/ Treasury, 
Bank of Tanzania, National Bank of Commerce) most 
urgent in their calls for root and branch reform.
Their demands for radical change were grounded in a 
firm belief substantial improvement on a sustained 
basis was attainable.
1972 - Patching Up and Planning Ahead
Within STC a patching up exercise had been begun in 1971.
As a holding operation this had marked success. Credit 
control forced halting purchases of overstocked goods and 
public pressure rebuilding supplies of these endemically 
unavailable. The process of debating credit with the NBC 
itself forced better identification of stocks and flows, 
facilitated by a reversion to rather rough and ready data 
collection which (unlike their sophisticated, centralized 
immediate predecessors) usually produced approximately correct 
figures in time to be of use. Further the pressure to get 
goods into stock and out to retailers forced de facto 
deconcentration of decisions which had previously piled 
up untaken on two or three desks. Shortages at least ceased
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to esculate and to some extent declined, credit use stabilized 
as did demands on foreign exchange, cash flow and surplus 
recovered fully (at least on paper - writeoffs of dead 
stock over 1972/73 - 1974/75 make comparison of year to 
year results over 1969/70 - 1973/74 of dubious utility).
Indeed by mid-1972 STC was showing signs of being able to 
cope at least in the absence of a new exogenous shock 
(e.g. a foreign exchange crisis). However, this was not a 
symptom of development or true structural reform but of 
partial reversion to the 1967-69 style of operation.
The patching up was essential in allowing the Working Group 
time to concentrate on analysis and preparing proposals for 
more basic (and necessarily longer term) structural change.
In its absence either STC would have collapsed or - more 
realistically - the Working Group would have become an 
emergency management team.
The analysis - somewhat hampered by STC's lack of data on 
what had been happening and the inability or unwillingness 
of most (not all) of its senior managers to appear to discuss 
problems with the group - is in effect summarized in the 
previous historical sketch. The key weaknesses identified 
were:
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1. overcentralization of everything leading to;
2. decisions piling up untaken on a handful of desks;
3. a data collection and analysis "system" quite unworkable 
given Tanzanian data recording and transmitting capacity 
and quite unnecessary to handle the relatively simple 
(in large trading enterprise terms) STC business leading 
to;
4. near complete lack of knowledge of sales, stocks, 
purchases, debts on any up to date basis and therefore;
5. an inability to get the right goods to the right place
at the right time.
The Working Group was not unanimous on how to proceed - 
its advice in mid 1972 to the Minister presented options of 
which the one embodying the greatest decentralization and 
the most radical structural changes was chosen. Its 
articulation and implementation - which was basically 
completed early in 1974 with at least half was introduced by
mid 1973 - was placed in the hands of a second Working Group,
this time of selected managers who were subsequently to 
serve with the overall coordination/control body (Board 
of Internal Trade) or new state trading units.
The new structure included:
1. Regional Trading Companies to handle general wholesaling 
in each region (imports and an increased share of local 
manufactures) serviced as to imports and some intraregional
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trade in manufactures by;
2. a series of specialized National Trading Companies 
(e.g. Agricultural and Industrial Supplies, Food,
Textiles, Household Supplies);
3. which in the case of technically complex products 
(e.g. Pharmaceuticals) and those requiring after 
sales service (e.g. some machinery and equipment) 
also carried on wholesaling;
4. two non-STC successor wholesale trading companies - 
Texco for domestically produced textiles and National 
Milling for grains and certain other staple foodstuffs 
(which it also was responsible for purchasing 
domestically and importing) and a number of wholesale 
(and to a lesser degree import) divisions of manufacturing 
parastatals e.g. Wood Industries Corporation, Steel 
Rolling Mill);
5. a Board of Internal Trade (rather oddly titled given the 
high import share) responsible for overall coordination, 
supervision, data analysis and personnel development
of the public trading sector (with the exception of 
NMC and exports and with special responsibility for 
the STC successors) and with the duty and power (used 
at least once) to take over interim management of any 
company descending toward a crisis.
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Each company was (is) self managing. The radical reduction 
in range of products and number of units was intended to 
simplify data collection, purchasing, distribution, 
inventory control and financial management. It appears 
to have had that result - at any rate the subsequent 
record has been of more timely, better informed decisions 
and a reduction in numbers both of "overhead" staff and 
of expatriates.
The STC successor companies are formally owned by the 
Treasury - to make financial supervision and control easier.
The Regional Trading Company Boards are largely regionally 
appointed, all Boards include worker and Party representatives.
Agriculture and Exports
Over the same period the export and food crop sub-sectors 
of state trading were also restructured. The Union and 
Cooperative Union levels of the Co-op sector came to be 
perceived as dominated by rural elites antagonistic to 
egalitarian socialism, economically inefficient at the 
expense of peasants and/or urban consumers and quite 
outside effective Party or government policy or planning 
control. In 1971 the CUT's rural credit institutions were 
taken away from it and made into financial sector parastatals. 
In 1976 the CUT and Unions were abolished and their functions
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as traders turned over to the Crop Authorities (NMC and 
the successors to Marketing Boards). The primary societies 
were abolished as such but their functions were turned over 
to the Village Councils of the 7,000 odd villages resulting 
from the 1967-76 (and especially 1974-76) alteration of 
rural settlement patterns from 85% dispersed to 90-95% in 
substantial villages.
The Crop Authorities (some of which have production support 
responsibilities) handle domestic purchasing, processing, 
domestic wholesaling (e.g. cotton to textile mills, cotton 
seed to oil mills), export sales (at domestic auction, 
by direct negotiation in Tanzania, to a degree direct to 
European markets). NMC handles about ten food (and minor 
export) crops with parallel responsibility for imports 
(or exports) to balance local sales and purchases where 
necessary for grains. The Sugar Authority has a parallel 
import/export and supply/demand balancing role for that 
crop.
Urban and Rural Retailing
State trading in the retail field has been at two levels - 
District Development Corporations and village (or to a 
much lesser extent urban neighborhood) shops. The first - 
in meat, petrol and less often other products - had a
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nearby uninterrupted record of feilure. On the whole 
goods were supplied (and exceptions, e.g. Dar meat, often 
related to conditions beyond the trading units control) 
albeit at a lower standard of service and quality than 
the private predecessors. However, cost control was 
notable for its absence and losses for their ubiquity. 
Workable managerial and staff development systems were 
nearly unknown - perhaps a criticism of the BIT as much 
as of the decentralized units, but a criticism to which 
the answer that all it could do was to supervise essential 
reconstruction and running in of the import/wholesale 
state trading structure would be almost wholly valid.
Thus as of 1978 urban public sector retail trade was 
limited to a handful of consumer co-ops and a small but 
growing number of retail outlets run by wholesale firms.
Village shops had a mixed record - enthusiasm often outran 
capacity. However, with the use of personnel trained 
at the Co-op College or in the very large and diversified 
1974-78 Adult Education programme, a growing number of Village 
Councils (perhaps approaching a half) had established 
viable retail shops by the end of 1978. The access to 
an articulated, functioning state trading sector at 
wholesale level, the relatively limited number of lines 
demanded (simplifying purchasing - stocktaking - accounting) 
and the retreat (partly for political but largely for
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economic reasons) of many of the non-citizen retailers 
to urban areas or abroad have created a climate more 
"technically" propitious than that of the early 1960's 
while 10 years of transition to socialism, broad adult 
literacy, and effective (in most cases) village councils 
have created a more supportive political setting.
Parallel Actions
A series of major policy and institutional changes over 
1972-74 significantly altered the context within which 
the import and wholesale side of state trading operated.
These were part of the general buildup of planned control 
of resource allocation as part of implementing the transition 
to socialism and also part of a fairly clear pattern of 
Tanzanian response to crises by seeking to cope immediately 
while creating a set of institutions and decision taking 
supports to avoid domestically generated and limit externally 
generated recurrences of the same crisis.
The most important were foreign exchange and credit budgeting, 
import licensing and "transfer price" checking, overall 
domestic price management and tightening of supervision 
over public enterprise annual physical/financial planning 
and use of surpluses. These can only be sketched here
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but are critical to the understanding of the altered 
environment in which state trading in Tanzania operated 
by the mid-1970's: one of quasi imperative planning with
a state near monopoly over external trade and finance but 
with very considerable reliance on managed (rigged) 
markets and no pretence whatsoever of material balances 
planning beyond a handful of key commodities such as grains.
1. Foreign exchange budgeting by import category gave 
indicative purchase limits to state trading importers - 
limits subject to some adjustment in respect to price 
changes for key individual imports and to a broad 
degree allocable by the firm within fairly broad 
import classification categories;
2. Domestic credit budgeting set overdraft ceilings and 
therefore guidelines on possible total of inventories 
and receivables;
3. Taken with foreign exchange budgeting it created 
incentives to use 90-180 day credit from sellers, 
develop domestic sources of supply, reduce receivables 
outstanding, monitor ratios of inventory to turnover
on a line by line basis and achieve a cash flow surplus 
to allow larger turnover and financial resource 
availability.
4. The budgets were worked out in some detail by the 
Bank of Tanzania and Treasury/Planning with support 
on articulation from the NBC and some consultation 
with major credit and foreign exchange users.
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Implementation was in NBC hands on credit and a new 
Import Licensing division (seen as the logical 
extension of exchange control) in the Bank of Tanzania;
5. Monitoring of physical correctness of shipments and 
discrepancies of prices from general norms was 
contracted out by the Bank of Tanzania to General 
Superintendence (a Swiss specialist firm) - without 
its clearance stamp no goods could be imported nor 
remittance made. Similar monitoring of major service 
contracts was carried out internally by the Bank of 
Tanzania and Treasury/Planning;
6. The somewhat narrowly titled Limitation of Dividends 
and Surpluses Act of 1973 and its 1974 Amendment 
created a set of powers (yet to be implemented for all 
public enterprises) for the Commissioner of Public 
Investments to require annual trading and capital plans/ 
budgets in physical and financial terms from each public 
enterprise. The BIT group of companies were among 
those in respect of which this procedure was first 
implemented.
7. Following the 1973 devaluation a Task Force studied 
the mechanics of creating a price management body.
Its report informed the 1973 Prices Act and its 
initial set of importer/manufacturer - wholsealer - 
retailer posted prices. The approach was one of price
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and margin management -not price control in the traditional 
sense. In the process of creating the new body^ the 
Task Force and the emerging BIT group carried out a 
rationalization of state trading margins (probably 
on balance reducing them) and a distinct narrowing 
of some retail margins. This was workable in 1973 
because the rising efficiency of state trading and a 
relatively relaxed import control (the balance of 
payments was for exogenous reasons strong from early 
1972 to the last quarter of 1973) meant that goods 
were more readily available (allowing squeezing of 
recently inflated margins) and that state trading 
margin freezes or cuts did not threaten the companies 
with bankruptcy.
Facing Exogenous Crisis; 1974-77
The combination of back to back droughts in 1973 and 1974 
and the impact of oil and related manufactured goods prices 
inflation made Tanzania rank number 3 on the UN's "most 
severely affected" list. An UNCTAD estimate showed that 
the 1972-74 loss of national purchasing power from terms 
of trade shifts alone was of the order of 11-12%. The 
resultant strains on state trading and the related institutions 
sketched above were severe.
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Not surprisingly a series of problems arose in respect
to the state trading sector:
1. the NMC while consistently good in projecting grain 
availability and demand initially failed to operate 
adequate external procurement leading to a short 1974 
physical shortage of supply - a breakdown fairly 
speedily reversed and not repeated;
2. somewhat slow adjustment of retail grain and sugar 
prices to meet the skyrocketing prices (and increased 
share) of imports led to large 1973 and 1974 deficits.
Mid and late 1974 price increases (as part of an 
overall price - wage - tax adjustment package) 
returned the NMC and Sugar Corporation to profit and 
the deficits were wiped out over 1975-77 as domestic 
supplies (cheaper than imports even after substantial 
grower price increases) replaced imports so that 
grain and sugar prices were not increased after 
November 1974 (indeed sugar and rice were reduced
in 1975/6);
3. with draconic import controls (relative to the size 
of the economy the physical volume of imports in 1976 
was 40% below 1973 and for consumer goods other than 
staple foods and inputs into consumer goods manufacturing 
the compression was over 50%) even improved inventory 
control and distribution could not avert increased 
shortages. These were particularly acute in rural 
areas. However, in contrast to the earlier crisis
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the core of essential goods (e.g. bread, grain, oil, 
sugar, salt, cloth, matches) were less frequently and 
more briefly out of stock - the long gaps were in 
semi-necessities and amenities;
4. a resurgence of private manufacturing of semi­
necessities and amenities occurred over 1975-77 with 
very few marketed via state trading bodies. This 
certainly reduced shortages and pressures on the BIT 
group but also eroded the public sector share of 
wholesale turnover;
5. as of mid 1974 almost all imports were confined to a 
limited range of state trading units - basically the 
BIT group, NMC. This did simplify import licensing 
as a means to implement the foreign exchange budget 
but - as before - raised costs, delays and inept 
procurement for firms using products in respect of 
which the BIT group had no expertise;
6. price management - even though based on forecast as 
well as past costs - had a tendency to squeeze actual 
margins (at least in % terms) by underestimating 
costs and to squeeze cash flow because of attempts to 
hold increases to one or two a year (with high margins 
early in the period to average out with low ones later).
These problems are hardly surprising given the degree and 
duration of the crisis. What is surprising is how well on 
balance the state trading enterprises and related institutions
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coped. Basic commodities were procured locally, imported, 
distributed without endemic shortages or major profiteering. 
After a traumatic adjustment to new world prices (about 
50% on the retail price index in late 1974 and early 1975) 
inflation was held at 10-15%, below the world average or 
the import price average for much of the period. The 
state trading sector on balance continued to achieve 
substantial surpluses while making the Price Commission's 
control side workable.
Over 1977-78 confinement was phased out in respect of 
public sector and large private sector users of specialized 
machinery, spares and raw materials/intermediate goods.
This change was seen as a permanent one, not merely part 
of the general (indeed too general) relaxation of import 
controls of late 1977 and early 1978. As of late 1978 
a renewed foriegn exchange crisis had arisen but - at 
least on the import side - had little relationship to state 
trading.
Agricultural export volume in 1978 was lower than in 1966. 
However, it is not clear that state trading was itself 
more than peripherally implicated in this failure - 
collection and payment had, if anything, improved over 
the period. Centrally marketed basic foodstuffs had 
doubled in volume - NMC clearly did improve collection
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and payment and 1974-78 price policy was more favourable 
to domestic food than to domestic industrial input or 
export crops. In respect to non-agricultural exports 
relatively little (beyond the existing diamonds case) 
had been achieved - initial experiments with textiles 
had ended with domestic demand exceeding supply and sisal 
twine and cashew k e m a l  exporting was still in its initial 
trial and error stages.
1979: Context and Goals
Tanzania in 1979 is structurally very different from 
1961 but remains very poor and very subject to exogenous 
shocks from the weather and/or international economy 
changes. In respect to trade:
1. It is now carried on in what is more a planned (rigged 
market) than a "free" market economy;
2. The bulk of imports, exports and wholesaling are in 
the hands of a relatively decentralized state trading 
sector;
3. A series of institutions and procedures - Prices 
Commission, annual enterprise plan review, Credit 
Budgeting, Foreign Exchange Budgeting, BIT - exist to 
provide operational guidelines for and direction 
over the state trading enterprises;
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4. nothing works quite as well or as consistently as 
intended - secondary mistakes are frequent and sometimes 
serious;
5. but over 1974-77 the system did surmount a crisis 
avoiding starvation, mass discontent, halting 
expansion of public services, radically cutting 
investment and returning to significant (4-6% real) 
output growth after a one year gap;
6. managerial and institutional experience is growing 
and is now predominantly Tanzanian not expatriate;
7. retail trade in the urban areas is still dominantly 
private (say 90-95%) and non-African (say 80%).
It is now, however, in a planned economy setting and 
subject to a not insignificant degree of control;
8. rural retail trade is swinging toward decentralized 
state trading although at present up to three quarters 
remains private and up to half non-African;
9. while there has been a revival of confidence in rural 
decentralized state trading the doubts as to its 
urban viability have been reinforced. In the more 
complex and competitive urban retail setting, the 
opportunity cost (especially in terms of training and 
of personnel) of building up dominant local government 
related or co-op retail stores is implicitly assumed
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to be prohibitive - implicitly because the question 
has never been fully reviewed since the Cosata 
debacle and hardly raised at all since the 1974-77 
failures in District Development Corporation trading.
Party goals as of 1978-79 do not appear to have elements 
requiring radical short term alteration/ as opposed to 
consolidation and efficiency improvement, of state trading:
1. greater emphasis on production (especially domestic 
foods and exports) to reduce vulnerability to external 
shocks and increase self reliance may lead to review 
of the export marketing sub-sector of state trading;
2. the liberation of Uganda is more likely to place 
strains on public sector transport than on state 
trading as Uganda/Tanzania trade was never large and 
is not likely to become so without medium term planned 
production coordination;
3. However, the liberation of Uganda^like the concerted 
struggle for the liberation of Southern Africa^does 
lead to possibilities and requirements for trade 
expansion with regional countries. State trading 
has been weak in that arena (even while the East 
African Community existed) and a rethinking of how 
existing units can acquire data and capacity to place 
exports/secure imports or a new specialized trading 
unit may be needed.
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4. at some point - probably before 1985 - renewed emphasis 
on taking worker participation further (requiring 
rethinking;reeducating and restructuring in existing 
state trading units) and on pushing the phase down 
of capitalism much further in urban retail trade 
(requiring serious attention to this sub-sector) 
is almost certain. However, it is unlikely to be in 
1979 or 1980.
Ill
F. Issues and Articulations
State trading is not an end in itself. Therefore the 
goals or targets for a state trading enterprise or sector 
should be identified before considering particular 
coverage, methods of initial entry and constraints.
At least there clusters of goals can be identified 
from the Tanzanian experience: gross national product and
surplus enhancement, consumer protection, broader political 
economic transformation. State trading can, in principle 
and in some contexts, be relevant to each - it is rarely 
likely to prove an adequate complete approach to any.
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Surplus/GDP
a. lowering the cost of imports (price of exports) by 
buying from (selling to) different enterprises or on 
different terms and by eliminating transfer pricing 
abuses resulting from importer/exporter transactions 
with jointly controlled companies. To achieve this 
requires personnel with knowledge of the relevant 
product markets and access to up to date data - bad 
buying (selling) can be more expensive than collusive 
trading;
b. augmenting national (especially public sector) surplus 
by acquiring the surplus flow previously going to 
private traders and/or by raising trading margins.
To achieve the former requires competent management 
(albeit if the only aim is to hold existing surplus
levels it entails less external purchasing expertise). 
The latter - margin raising - route is simple) 
but in general would appear to be inferior to general 
or selective tax increases yielding the same revenue;
c. providing a set of institutions more co-operative 
with the exchange control authorities i.e. not likely 
to engage as principals or agents in capital flight. 
This requires that the state trading enterprises are 
dominant in import/export and especially in general 
goods with many alternative external sources and 
domestic traders;
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Consumer Protection
d. price control implementation via margin limitation 
(for the state trader) and control (for private 
traders buying from it i.e. enforced retail price 
with halting of supply as penalty for breach). This 
requires a dominant import/wholesale position in the 
goods to be controlled and a flow of goods not 
radically below "controlled" retail price demand
so far as controlling retailers goes. On margin 
limitation it requires excess initial margins, 
greater operating efficiency or acceptance of a lower 
surplus (or a loss);
e. improved availability of goods through altering the 
mix of procurement (e.g. more priority to staples) 
and/or the priorities in distribution (e.g. basic 
up-country shipments first priority) may be more 
critical to consumers (including small traders and
manufacturers) than marginal price changes. To
*
achieve this goal requires data on demand by product 
and province plus a well functioning stock reporting 
system at least down to provincial level and a relatively 
smoothly working transport system to up-country depots;
f. reducing selling (buying) price differentials by 
setting uniform (or less unequal) prices nationally
or for a number of specified points benefits up-country 
buyers (producers) either at the expense of those
nearer main towns and ports (if transport equalization 
costs are computed and new prices set to retain surplus) 
or of public sector surplus (if - say - uniform prices 
are set at the old metropolitan price level). The 
setting of such prices on a wide range of products 
with substantial transport costs is very time consuming 
if mistakes leading to surplus loss or unintended 
"reshipments" are to be avoided;
Political Economic Transformation
g. citizenisation of senior personnel combined with 
national ownership can increase self reliance and 
national control over economic decision taking.
This result requires training of citizens and overall 
public institution attention to trading to ensure 
that state trading citizen management is or becomes 
present, effective and acting in ways different from 
its predecessors;
h. decentralisation can be promoted or strengthened by 
placing state trading units in the hands of provinces 
or local councils. For this to have a positive 
effect it is essential that the decentralized units 
be able to operate/control the enterprises;
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i. transition to social democracy with a substantial state
direct economic role, to state capitalism or to socialism 
requires a significant state trading sector. The exact 
requirements on the enterprises depend on the nature 
and speed of transition envisaged.
These goals are not necessarily alternatives any more than 
they are necessarily present in every state trading sector 
or enterprise. Unless the state trading sector is 
perceived as a desired channel of (rather random) 
consumption transfer payments^some surplus generation 
considerations will be almost universally present. Beyond 
that it is difficult to generalize about particular 
enterprise or even sectoral goal makeup and prioritization.
Sectoral Coverage
Appropriate sectoral coverage depends on goals and capacities. 
This sounds trite but is often overlooked - import houses 
do not eliminate retail overcharging nor domestic produce 
collection systems solve problems of abnormally and 
artificially low export prices.
The main sub-sectors are importing, wholesaling of imports 
and domestically produced goods, export produce collection, 
exporting and retailing. The last is not particularly 
suitable for centralized state trading and the buildup of 
co-operative or local government enterprises to handle it 
tends to be arduous and slow.
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Within each sub-sector, different products have different 
characteristics. A wheat flour importing - local purchasing 
and milling - distribution and wholesaling operation is 
quite different from automobile and lorry importation - 
stocking - sales - service. Similarly copper metal and 
concentrate exporting pose different problems. It is 
quite untrue that experience in one sub-sector or product 
is necessarily relevant to others - especially at 
purchasing and selling levels.
There is no a priori case for one unit in each sub-sector. 
Importing and wholesaling may usefully be combined if a 
limited number of products with similar distribution 
patterns and a total turnover of under $20 million are 
involved. Equally if total imports handled exceed - say - 
$50 million a case for specialized, multiple import 
enterprises is likely to exist.
Initial Entry
Except in the context of a literally revolutionary govern­
mental and political economic transformation^initial entry 
is likely to be partial even if it is intended to create 
a dominant state trading position in the medium term. 
Experience, institutions and personnel built up before 
massive expansion can increase capacity for further 
development. On the other hand, purely nominal entry -
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especially as a minority partner in a joint venture - is 
unlikely to give much relevant experience or alter the 
structure of commerce significantly.
The choices in respect of initial entry include:
a. nationalization (or majority joint venture with) 
existing private firm, joint venture with new private 
partner, building a trading wing onto an existing 
public enterprise, creating a new public enterprise;
b. using old (expatriate) management under a management 
contract, negotiating a management contract with a 
new foreign firm, self management (including direct 
hire of any expatriate personnel needed);
c. setting out to achieve a commercial success on 
fairly standard business lines first, initiating 
structural changes first or seeking to balance the 
two sets of aims from the start;
d. initiating state trading largely or exclusively in 
one sub-sector (or one geographic area), in several 
selected areas, or on a broad front.
Little can be said about the appropriate choice in the 
abstract. In general the first choice listed is the least 
risky and least likely to produce radical changes and 
the last the most difficult to operate successfully but 
also the most productive when it is possible to implement 
efficiently.
-  57 -
The greater the scope of the initial state trading field 
(and therefore the greater its capacity to create crisis 
if it goes wrong), the less the experience and personnel 
available to the state and the greater the need to achieve 
initial successes to bolster public service and public 
confidenceythe stronger the case for initial choice 
of a low or intermediate risk option. First steps need 
not be last steps if they are in the right direction and 
help in discerning the further course of the trail.
Expansion Targets and Trajectories
How fast and far state trading should be expanded depends 
partly on resources available, partly on performance but 
most on the purposes it is intended to serve. If these 
are limited to increasing competition and earning a return 
on state investment^normal commercial criteria apply.
If they relate to providing basic goods/wholesale depots 
and produce buying points up-country a planned buildup 
of coverage to all provinces over five years may be 
appropriate. If effective state control over foreign 
exchange and surplus is sought - whether as an integral 
part of a transition to socialism or otherwise - then 
priority must be given to building up the state trading 
position to dominate import and export trade (and probably 
wholesaling) and to be strong enough to enforce some
%
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limits on private wholesale/retail margins and price- 
patterns. In the last case a decade is a not unreasonably 
leisurely time span^but it should be used to set and achieve 
interim targets^not justify delay.
Crisis affect buildup in various ways. If generated 
within the existing state trading system they usually 
require a delay for revival, reconstruction and consolidation. 
If external, they may - e.g. predatory competition by or 
sudden departure of major private firms - require emergency 
expansion or may - e.g. general foreign exchange crisis 
and import controls - create a case for a broader state 
trading role (to help implement controls and to cut the 
scope for "entrepreneurs of adversity" using shortages 
as a highroad to riches) at the same time as making it 
harder to achieve^because financial and personnel resources 
are under more than normally severe pressure.
Constraints
State trading development will be constrained to the extent 
any or all of the following are in scarce supply:
1. public sector finance (including borrowing capacity) 
for premises, vehicles, stocks and receivables;
X
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2. public sector institutional experience and capacity 
in respect to public enterprise in general and state 
trading in particular;
3. public sector knowledge (and ability to acquire 
more rapidly) in respect of the existing commercial 
sector (including domestic and external sources, 
markets, prices) and of relevant state trading experience 
elsewhere;
4. public sector ownership or ability to acquire suitable 
functioning trading units and/or their assets and 
contacts;
5. citizen personnel with relevant training and experience 
to staff state trading enterprises and related public 
sector units (e.g. Board of Trade, Price Commission, 
Import Control, Co-operative Development);
6. public sector capacity to secure expatriates with 
training, experience and loyalties relevant to filling 
gaps in citizen cadres - including training citizen 
replacements;
7. public sector self confidence and public confidence
in the public sector as able to reach targets, achieve 
desired changes and - in particular - operate business 
enterprises.
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Constraints do not normally prevent action - they limit 
how much can be done how soon and how well (and by 
whom in respect to use of expatriates to augment citizen 
personnel). One major goal of first steps is to 
produce resources which loosen the constraints and allow 
further development.
The most general constraint, however, is what else needs 
to be done i.e. the opportunity cost of creating or expanding 
state trading in terms of something else left undone or 
postponed. Negotiators on copper mine taxation or 
development cannot at the same time negotiate on establishing 
an import/wholesale corporation or an agreement with a 
London brokerage house on a joint marketing operation for 
coconut products. Accountants of wholesale depots are 
not available to staff provincial tax offices. Bank 
credit used to finance inventories of state trading 
ventures cannot be put into Treasury stock to finance a 
hydroelectric station.
How much of each scarce resource can reasonably be devoted 
to state trading at any time depends on what importance 
and temporal priority is given to it. Firm allocations 
limited to resources likely to be available in the first 
place offer a better planning and implementation setting 
than much larger resources initially promised and suddenly 
cut back after implementation has begun.
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G. Some PNG Considerations
PNG in 1979 is not Tanzania in 1961 albeit it shares certain 
characteristics including a very severe shortage of citizen 
personnel with civil service or managerial training or 
experience and a limited set of relevant institutions and 
policies. One of its potential advantages is the 
international setting less hostile and sceptical to 
peripheral economy acquisition and operation of productive 
enterprises, a second its partially related experience 
in respect of mining strategy determination and negotiation, 
a third a more advanced and articulated planning apparatus 
and a fourth the possibility of benefitting from Tanzanian 
(and other peripheral economy) experience.
Strategic Choices
Three strategic choices will directly influence the 
appropriate initial nature and scope of state trading 
even though each is considerably wider and unlikely to be 
taken on state trading grounds:
1. continuation of a relatively free trading approach
or a (presumably selective) use of tariff or non-tariff 
protection to increase self reliance in widely consumeld
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foodstuffs and manufactures. The latter decision would 
increase the importance of domestic wholesale and 
distribution channels unlikely to be provided by the 
existing trading houses and might also justify taking 
over imports of the items in question to limit 
destructive competition;
2. the degree to which state (or provincial or local
governmental) owned enterprise is to become a central
structural element and in particular whether finance 
and foreign trade are to become dominantly in the 
state sector to implement resource (foreign exchange, 
surplus, credit) allocation. A decision to pursue
a public enterprise centered approach over a brief 
time period would necessitate rapid buildup of state 
trading centered on import/export operations and at 
the same time would maximize total enterprise sector 
personnel and public institution requirements;
3. whether PNG is to embark on a transition to socialism
and, if so, what are perceived as the key obstacles 
and forms of exploitation to be overcome.
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Import/Wholesale
Subject to the previous notes on impact of strategic 
decisions, the general impact and wholesale business 
would appear to be the most promising point for instit­
uting state trading. The range of activities would 
include collection of data on demand, purchasing, import­
ing and central warehousing, distribution to provincial 
(at regional) warehouses, wholesaling.
Initial entry into specialised goods - eg vehicles or 
mining equipment - is probably unwise. So- barring a 
decision to embark on a speedy transition to socialism - 
is an immediate takeover of all general importing (let 
alone all wholesaling). However, consideration should 
be given to taking over 100% of certain major imports eg 
sugar, flour, beer, cigarettes, galvanised sheet, cement, 
dairy products - as soon as capacity to handle them is 
created or acquired. (Confinements for goods not actually 
handled should be avoided if possible). Similarly sole 
power - and duty - to import should be given in respect 
of goods (eg potentially dairy products, fresh meat) in 
respect of which major attempts to achieve national self 
sufficiency are being made and a priority duty of the 
storage, distribution, wholesale functions should be to 
handle the domestic product effectively. (If other 
wholesalers wish to handle it and/or the production units 
can distribute directly there is no self evident case for
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giving the general import/wholesale Company a monopoly 
on the domestic product hut it will then need to co­
ordinate to avoid swamping or starving the market by 
faulty import decisions).
Once the state trading unit is successfully established 
with - say - a quarter of the general impact trade 
(perhaps 10.15% of total imports), consideration will be 
needed as to whether it should be expanded to a dominant 
position in respect to general imports and whether it 
should extend its coverage to more specialised times.
At the same time consideration of structure - eg three 
or four specialised importing companies with central 
storage and limited wholesaling functions, four to six 
general required wholesale enterprises (eg Port Moresby, 
Gazelle, Bougainville, North East, Northern Highlands, 
Southern Highlands) and a Board of Trade to perform 
sectoral planning, training, coordination and regulation 
functions - should be carried out.
Initial management poses problems. The simplest route 
- creating a joint venture or a 100% takeover plus man­
agement contract - with a present major private importer 
would create a viable trading enterprise with an exper­
ienced management. Whether it would really increase PNG 
central over trading or provide a vehicle for broader 
change is quite another matter - probably not without major 
government attention and a subsequent management change.
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Building up a new venture from scratch with self manage­
ment (including individually hired expatriates) would 
be slow, risky and demanding a degree and type of 
government supervision which is probably not available.
To a lesser extent the same would hold for a new company 
with a management contract with a firm not previously 
active in the South Pacific region.
A possible compromise approach would include:
a. acquisition of one large importer/wholesaler;
b. retention of its citizen staff and - on secondment - 
selected experienced expatriates;
c. Contracting with the Scandinavian Wholesale Co-operat­
ive Federation of Copenhagen (an import-wholesale venture 
of the national nordic co-op federations) for a senior 
management team (including purchasing expertise) and a 
citizen staff development programme.
d. creating a state trade liaison unit in Planning or 
Commerce to work closely with the new enterprise to build 
up government expertise and to identify problems for 
trading well before they reach crisis level. As a base 
for a subsequent Board of Trade this unit must include 
senior oppropriately trained PN2 officials not expatriate 
advisers and standard PNG civil administrators only.
If this approach is adopted the Scandinavian Federation 
or one of the national federations could be approached in 
respect of a pre-establishment consultancy team to work 
with a PNG Task Force. Alternatively CFTC might be
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approached for a Commonwealth team.
PNG already has a public interprise involvement in respect 
of commodity exports which it may wish to expand. The 
presumptive reason would be attaining better prices which 
requires either access to major world market price data 
virtually on a daily basis or contracts with buyers linked 
to world market prices on delivery date and requiring supply 
of proof of stated price. The data - for some commodity - 
can be served from the Reuters Commodity Service (telex) 
and for others could probally be purchased (and telexed) 
from selected trading or information firms in Australia,
Japan, the USA (preferably West Coast for PNG), the UK, the 
Netherlands and Federal Germany.
Initially specialisation in two or three crops - eg coconut
products, coffee, timber - would seem desireable to limit the
amount of knowledge and range of market patterns. Information 
on state trading in some of these products (eg timber in 
Malaysia, coconut products in Sri Lanka, coffee in Tanzania) 
can probably be secured by CFTC PNG is not a large enough 
producer for either local auctions or multiple overseas 
offices to be commercially practicable. Negotiation of 
relatively large contracts with users - oil millers, soap 
makers, edible coconut products wholesalers, timber whole­
salers - or use of selected traders (with regular checking 
of price received against market data) would, on the face
of it, appear the most practical approaches.
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Again an initial senior management team would be needed. 
The Scandinavian Wholesale Co-op Federation would again 
be a potential source - seconded employees could in this 
case be counted upon not to sell at special prices to 
their permanant employer which is a substantial buyer of 
several of these items though not currently from PNG. 
Alternatively a middle sized broking house might be 
interested in a minority stake in a joint venture and so 
long as clear barriers to its selling to itself were 
maintained this might be a viable initial approach. 
Identifying such a firm would pose problems and require 
specialist advice.
Copper presents different issues. A PNG state trading 
enterprise acting as sole seller - on the lines of 
Zambia*s Memaco - could raise the total foreign exchange 
receipts if it operated effectively. CFTC could secure 
detailed advice based on Zambian and Chilean (pre 1973) 
experience. However, so long as copper is exported as 
mixed concentrate and not as blister or refined it is 
doubtful that the expertise to run such a sale marketing 
company could be securred. That is an additional 
revison for pressing ahead with securring local smelting 
(blister) for Bougainville and possibly local refining 
when the second mine is in production.
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Subwholesalinq, Retailing and Export Collection
Subwholesaling and retailing are not very suitable sub­
sectors for a national state trading venture. Whether 
they are priority areas for action in PNG is a different 
question.
Up-country shops - PNG national owned private or village 
co-ops - could be helped by provincial and required 
wholesale depots and (possibly) further transporting by 
a state trading enterprise. A programme for training 
managers and bookeepers could be run by the state trad­
ing company on a contract from the government or as a 
part of a co-operative development programme.
In respect to urban trade,the key question is whether it 
is reasonably efficient and has reasonably acceptable 
profit margins. If yes, a moderately low key training 
programme for a limited number of consumer co-op per­
sonnel may be adequate. If not a small number of retail 
outlets in major towns could be handled by the import/ 
wholesale corporation and retail price control based on 
its wholesale prices established and enforced (at least 
as long as there were no major physical shortages).
Whether domestic food export crop collection is a 
priority area for state trading depends on the ade­
quacy and cost of existing collection structures. A 
case for the export corporation opening purchase depots 
in main producing areas and for the import/wholesale 
unit doing likewise for selected products (eg. meat,
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dairy products) can be made. Similarly, for smallholder 
(peasant) production, co-operative supply of inputs and 
seasonal credits initial purchasing, bulking up, initial 
storage would appear likely to be economically and tech­
nically viable and consistent with PNGs political economic 
strategy. However, such developments - especially for 
the village co-ops - require careful personnel training 
(short courses for village members plus perhaps account­
ants and technical advisers serving groups of co-operatives) 
at the initiation of the programme. The village co-op 
operation is unlikely to be successful without prior pro­
vision of state trading unit buying (and possibly agri­
cultural input and implement selling) depots and arrange­
ments for provision of seasonal credit, advisers/inspec­
tors and technical support..
Provincial Enterprises
Neither the import nor the export field appears appropriate 
for provincial state trading. The expertise and volume 
requirements on the one hand and the relationship to specifi­
cally national goods on the other lead to this conclusion.
Wholesaling, in principle, may be different. However, at 
present at most three provinces (Port Moresby, Bougainville, 
Gazelle) would seem likely to be able to create economic 
enterprises with any substantial degree of provincial per­
sonnel input on control. Even in their cases it is probable
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that such a venture would be premature.
If it is desired to provincialise state trading at whole­
sale level, then this could be kept in mind in organising 
the systems and structural patterns of an initially 
national company. Then after two to five years experience 
a deliberate provincialisation (or regionalisation for the 
provinces with the smallest turnover and personnel avail­
ability) programmes could be set up while retaining 
supervisory and coordinating powers plus training and 
backing managerial support with a national Board of Trade.
Retailing is almost certainly unsuitable for regional 
operation. Village or urban neighbourhood co-operatives 
are much less unlikely to be efficient albeit, as noted 
earlier, their building is likely to be a lengthy and 
tedious porcess.
Prices and Margins
State trading should not raise general consumer prices 
above or reduce general producer prices below what they 
otherwise would be. (Taxation is a more appropriate 
instrument). Assuming care is taken to avoid excess 
costs (eg. too many senior personnel, too high stocks, 
too many bad debts, poor purchasing or selling) there is 
no reason to assume it will have that effect. Indeed, 
to the extent that it increases competition for previous
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oligopolists and/or improves up-country distribution/ 
collection^it should affect consumer and grower prices 
positively.
Beyond that caution is needed:
1. Pan-provincial (main wholesale depot at major 
centre retail) price equalisation should be introduced 
selectively and with care to avoid losses on distant 
sales centres not offset by gains on sales real import or 
production points;
2. initial margins should be set to allow a surplus 
on fairly cautious assumptions as to turnover and costs 
(subject to the constraint of rarely and marginally 
raising the price above the previous private sector 
level!) - it is better to be able to cut them later than 
to face the need for a margin and price raising exercise 
to escape from a sea of red ink and subsidies;
3. price control is probably better handled by a 
separate quasi independent body - with its own data 
collection powers and analysts responsible to a 
Commissioner perhaps with a board representative of 
consumers, producers, workers and political parties - 
than by a state trading enterprise whose margins and
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State trading can limit profit margins and sometimes 
purchase/sell at prices more nationally advantageous 
than private enterprise. It can be a tool of managing 
price movements. However, the degree to which it can 
reduce consumer prices (especially in an inflationary 
world) is usually limited. In the absence of concrete 
data on why PNG or some provinces, are exceptions it 
would be imprudent to make larger claims in this 
respect or to seek to implement them without regard to 
financial viability. To do so would create an area of 
failure and distract attention from what state trading 
actually can achieve.
H. Concluding Note
This paper does not argue whether or not PNG should decide 
to embark on state trading. That is a decision for PNG 
decision takes responsible to the people of PNG to make.
It does seek to set out what state trading can achieve 
as illustrated by its research in a somewhat similar state 
- Tanzania - are the past two decades. This may help 
inform them who must advise PNG decision takers and allow 
a decision based on broader knowledge than would other­
wise be available.
Nor does it seek to structure state trading for PNG. In 
part that too requires political decisions. Further it 
requires detailed knowledge of PNG public sector resources,
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surplus generating capacity are themselves major con­
cerns in respect to price determination. Implementa­
tion assistance - informing retailers of approved prices, 
cutting supplies to profiteers, supporting co-ops - 
can be assisted by state trading ventures but to give 
them central price setting powers is to create a built 
in conflict of interest situation.
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priorities and constraints and of the political economic 
context of PNG# best supplied by PNG officials (citizen 
or experienced expatriate). Finally it is desireable that 
specific venture creation be based on detailed feasibility 
studies of that venture which can be done only after initial 
political and broad technical decisions. Again the Tan­
zanian experience may offer useful guidelines, comparisons 
and approaches to use, adapt (or avoidI)
However, in general it seems fair to say that state trading 
can be useful to most peripheral economies. This is 
especially true for those committed to reduction of 
inequality, increased self reliance and reducing depend­
ence on foreign and domestic minority community capitalists.
i
On that basis,it would appear reasonable to suppose that 
state trading can play a positive and growing role in the 
development of Papua New Guinea by and for Papua New 
Guinean workers and peasants.
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